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ABSTRACT: Prior research has found that depression affects how individuals recall selfdefining memories by preventing individuals from properly encoding and retrieving memories,
resulting in a suspected inability to recall specific events and information (Conway, 1990). The
current study aimed to replicate this finding and to examine whether this phenomenon exists
within those with higher levels of anxiety, a concept not previously studied. Fifty-three
participants were asked to recall two self-defining memories (Singer & Blagov, 2000) and fortyseven participants described where they saw themselves two years from now in order to
determine whether depression and anxiety affect future projections as well as memory recall. It
was hypothesized that individuals who score higher on depression and anxiety inventories would
respond to the self-defining memory task with generic or episodic memories more often than
they would with a specific response, a hypothesis that was not supported, although memory type
(pure specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple singe events, episodic, and
generic) was predictive of scores on the BDI and BAI. It was also hypothesized that these
individuals would write about their future using more negatively valenced words and shorter
response lengths than would individuals who scored lower on these inventories, and it was found
that valence, although not response length was predictive of scores on the BAI. These findings
suggest that the self-defining memory task and self-defining future projections task may be a
good indicator of high anxiety and depression as determined by the BAI and BDI and can be
used as a tool to identify individuals for early intervention for anxiety and depression treatment.
Keywords: depression, anxiety, self-defining memories, self-defining future projections
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The Effect of Anxiety and Depression on Self-Defining Memory and Self-Defining Future
Projections
Memory is an integral part of the human existence, and it is memory that guides everyday
decisions and shapes one’s personality over time. As described in detail by Inglis (2014), the
formation of a memory begins with one of the five memory pathways in the brain: semantic,
episodic, procedural, automatic, and emotional. These pathways are involved in both the coding
and storage of memories, as well as the retrieval of memories at a later date. The events that are
associated with these memories determine which pathway to storage and retrieval the brain
utilizes. Compared to the three other memory pathways, the episodic and emotional memory
pathways are more crucial in self-defining memory as the result of their content.
Episodic memories entail details concerning locations and circumstances surrounding
events (Inglis, 2014). In other words, the setting of the memory is important during retrieval, just
as when you walk into a room you are more apt to remember past events that have occurred
there. Emotional memories have priority over the four other memory types, in the sense that
emotionally toned memories can be linked to threats and therefore are more important for
survival than other memory types (Inglis, 2014). Emotions play a strong role in the formation of
memory and almost every memory has an emotion tied to it. For example, witnessing something
traumatic, such as the passing of a relative in the hospital, can result in the memory of hospitals
becoming linked to feelings of sadness and fear, and may even deter an individual from ever
entering a hospital again. Even more interestingly, “if the emotional stimuli is [sic] too strong,
the formation of factual memory can actually be blocked by neurochemicals” (Inglis, 2014,
p.43), impacting an individual’s ability to store and retrieve accurate memories. Memories help
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form our perception of the world, our actions and behaviors, beliefs, and our ability to make
decisions. More importantly, memories, especially episodic and emotional memories, shape our
personality and are strongly linked to our emotional states.
Not defined as one of the five major memory pathways, autobiographical memory is
considered episodic memory, or more specifically, consists of consciously recalled episodic
memories (Rubin, 2005; Tulving 1972; 1983). In fact, Philippe, Koestner, Beau-lieu-Pelletier,
Lecours, and Lekes (2012) found that autobiographical memories are often linked to other types
of memory, even ones with less importance to the self. It is this connection between these
various memory types that makes up the memory network. However, autobiographical memories
are more vivid than most memories, and in the act of recalling these memories, individuals feel
as if they are reliving the event and can typically describe details and specifics, although these
details may be unclear and inaccurately remembered (Brewer, 1999; Rubin, 1998). It is also
important to note the emotional nature of these memories, as they often highly impact the
choices an individual later makes and work to shape an individual into his or her present self.
Rubin (2005) demonstrated that the amygdala, which is associated with emotion, and the
hippocampus, associated with episodic memory, were more active during the retrieval of
autobiographical memory than during the retrieval of semantic memory, highlighting the
episodic and emotional nature of these memories. Conway proposed a definition of
autobiographical memory when he stated:
Autobiographical memory includes memories for specific experiences and memory for
the personal facts of one’s life… Autobiographical memories for specific experiences
represent interpretations of complex events, which are extended in time and may feature
multiple actors and locations… Long-term collection of general features of the event,
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interpretations, and some recall of a few specific details characterize the autobiographical
memory of the experiment (Conway, 1990, pp. 4-5).
Conway’s definition hints at the complexity of autobiographical memory and its importance in
understanding complex events, which influence how we interpret and respond to similar events.
Conway’s definition of autobiographical memory comes years after autobiographical
memory first became a focus of psychological research. Nearly a decade earlier, researchers such
as Kolodner and Schank began theorizing about autobiographical memory (Kolodner, 1980;
Schank, 1982), noting the importance of understanding earlier memories and how they, in turn,
aid in understanding later events. An understanding and analysis of past events allows an
individual to process events of a similar nature much faster and with better success (Barsalou,
1988). Autobiographical memory is thought to have five main components: a) cueing, b) a search
process, c) retrieval of a narrative, d) visual imagery, and e) affective components, similar to
other memory models (Rubin, 1988). More specifically, autobiographical memory is impacted
and shaped by individual senses (hearing, sight, and smell), spatial reasoning (location),
emotions, narrative systems, which help understand relations between various objects, as well as
a memory system which helps to organize and store the aforementioned stimuli and information
(Rubin, 2005). The complexity and vast connection of autobiographical memory to various
neurological processes exemplifies the importance of these memories in everyday life and the
development of the self. It is clear that these memories are more than just basic knowledge or
insignificant memories lost over time.
Autobiographical memory is complex and therefore cannot be understood in isolation.
Autobiographical reasoning is the process in which individuals recall and analyze their
autobiographical memories. Autobiographical reasoning allows an individual to relive an event,
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and then use the consequences and lessons learned from that event to shape and guide decisions
throughout daily life (Singer & Bluck, 2001). As a result, autobiographical memories play an
important role in determining how an individual sees the world and interprets the events that
occur in his or her life.
Self-Defining Memories.
The concept of autobiographical memory expanded over the years as research allowed
experimenters to further understand the implications of these memories and how they work.
More current research refers to these salient memories as “self-defining memories,” reflecting
the importance of these memories to the self. Singer and Blagov (2000) published a classification
manual concerning self-defining memories, in which explicit guidelines for self-defining
memories were set forth. A self-defining memory is one which is (a) over one year old, (b)
remembered very clearly and which has importance in both meaning and theme, (c) is linked to
other similar memories, (d) invokes a feeling, and (e) has been thought about frequently, and
thus is familiar to the individual. Singer and Blagov also created a classification system by which
to score and code self-defining memories. Within this classification system, self-defining
memories are more broadly organized as being specific or non-specific based on the content
contained within them (Singer & Blagov, 2000). Specific memory narratives consist of a unique
occurrence and are focused on an event that occurred within a single day. Within the specific
memory classification, memories can be considered pure specific memories (the recalled
memory consists only of single-event statements which are related to one another), a specific
memory with generalization (a single-event statement which contains mentions of other events as
well), and a specific memory with multiple single events (the recalled memory may consists of
several specific memories or may also contain a specific memory as well as an episodic or
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generic memory). Non-specific memories are classified as either episodic or generic. An episodic
memory lacks any single-event statements and is less detailed in both content and emotion.
Furthermore, these memories tend to occur over a larger span of time when compared to specific
memories. A generic memory is a memory that has occurred over time and is repetitive
throughout an individual’s life. These reoccurring events blend into one memory (Singer &
Blagov, 2000-2001).
Self- Defining Memories and Depression.
Given the complexity of self-defining memory and the involvement of various brain
regions and pathways, researchers have examined the effects of depression on self-defining
memories. Depression has a known effect on memory; in general, it reduces the amount of
attention and resources that individuals can allocate to their environments (Bolles, 1998). With
respect to self-defining memory, Conway (1990) hypothesized that depression has a clouding
effect on self-defining memory, an effect that may act as an adaptive function in order to protect
an individual from memories, which might exacerbate his or her depressive state (Conway,
1990). An individual essentially blocks out parts of memories that may be harmful to his or her
emotional state, as a protective factor.
With a relationship established between depression and reduced encoding and retrieval of
memory, researchers examined the effect of depression more specifically on autobiographical
memories. Moore, Watts, and Williams (1988) suggested that deficits and biases in
autobiographical memory result from an inability to progress beyond general recall, as a result of
the effects of depression, to a more specific memory. Interestingly, they found that depressed
individuals, when asked to recall a specific positive memory, instead responded with a general
memory, unable to recall a specific memory, even when prompted to do so. This suggests that
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when attempting to recall a memory, individuals first access general memories and then move to
specific recall. Barsalou (1988) proposed a similar processing model, in which individuals move
from general memory to specific memory, a phenomenon termed the hypothesis of event
organization. When trying to understand an event, the comprehension hypothesis of event
organization states that generic information concerning the event is first retrieved, which helps to
establish a basic understanding of what is occurring. If other memories are similar to the one
currently being analyzed, those memories help create a more accurate inference of the events in
the original memory. Finally, each memory event is an integration of generic knowledge and the
specifics concerning the event. It is the comprehension of the event that determines how the
memory is to be stored and organized in memory. As was suggested by the findings of Moore,
Watts, and Williams (1988) as well as the hypothesis of event organization, when attempting to
recall specific memories, the pathology of depression hinders an individual from progressing
beyond general recall to specific recall. Depression’s clouding effect may prevent full
comprehension of an event, impacting the storage and organization of memory, and interfering
with an individual’s ability to recall specific details of an event.
The inability to progress past general memory to specific memory in individuals
diagnosed with depression has been demonstrated by multiple researchers. Moffit, Singer,
Nelligan, Carlson, and Vyse (1994) found that individuals diagnosed with depression struggled
to retrieve and describe specific positive memories when asked to do so. More specifically,
depressed individuals recalled more summary-type memories than did a normative population
when asked to provide a self-defining memory. Moffit et al. suggested that individuals’ inability
to recall a specific self-defining memory was the due to a lack of specific details to retrieve.
They proposed that the specific details of the memory had not being encoded in the first place,
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years earlier. Therefore, these individuals could not retrieve specific cues, as they did not exist,
preventing an individual with depression from moving from a general recall to a specific
memory.
The inability to recall specifics had been demonstrated among clinically depressed
samples as well. Individuals who had attempted suicide had a harder time recalling positive
memories compared to the speed at which they were able to recall a negative memory (Williams
& Broadbent, 1986). These findings are not surprising given that individuals diagnosed with
emotional disorders are more likely to have memories biased by their current moods, and are
more likely to recall a negative event faster than a positive event (Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Lloyd
& Lishman, 1975; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979). Furthermore, it was found that the individuals
who overdosed (deemed clinically depressed), accessed nonspecific memories more than specific
memories for both positive and negative cueing; however, this phenomenon was more strongly
demonstrated for positive cueing (Williams & Broadbent, 1986). Similarly, a meta-analysis
performed on eleven studies demonstrated a significant difference between depressed individuals
and controls in their ability to recall non-specific memories and specific memories. The overall
findings suggested that depressed individuals were significantly more likely to produce a nonspecific memory than the controls, who were more likely to produce a specific memory when
prompted. Even more convincingly, these researchers discovered a mean Cohen’s d statistic of
0.94, indicating a very strong effect size (Williams et al., 2007).
It is clear that depression and autobiographical memory recall are linked, but what is the
importance of this relationship? One study found that individuals who were depressed and
provided non-specific memories when prompted, especially for positive memories, were less
likely to recover from depression and were less responsive to anti-depressant treatment
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(Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993). These findings suggest that autobiographical
memory may be valuable in identifying and targeting individuals who, as a result of persistent
depression are less responsive to pharmacological treatment and are at a greater risk from
attempting suicide, given that a relationship between suicide attempters and non-specific
memory recall has been found (Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Williams &
Broadbent, 1986).
The Relationship Between Depression and Anxiety.
Although depression and anxiety are classified as separate disorders, there is some
overlap between the two disorders in their symptomology, and comorbidity with anxiety and
mood disorders is high. Some of the overlapping symptoms of depression and anxiety include
oversensitivity to criticism, self-consciousness, feeling rejected, dysphoria, sleep disturbances,
appetite disturbances, fatigue, and irritability (Liebowitz, 1993; Zajecka & Ross, 1995).
According to the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5) individuals who meet the criteria for generalized anxiety disorder are likely to have
met, either currently or previously, the criteria for unipolar depressive disorders (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). The DSM-5 suggests that “the neuroticism or emotional liability
that underpins this pattern of comorbidity is associated with temperamental antecedents and
genetic and environmental risk factors shared between these disorders” (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013, p.226). Wetzler and Katx (1989) found that in a review of 17 studies, 10 of
which pertained to individuals with anxiety and 7 of which pertained to individuals with
depression, that the other condition existed within patients 50% of the time, suggesting that a
link may exist between these two disorders. Other research suggests that the comorbidity rates
between these two disorders may be even higher, with 85% of patients with depression also
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experiencing symptoms of anxiety and 90% of patients with an anxiety disorder also having
symptoms of depression (Gorman, 1997). Gorman (1997) also suggests that patients with
comorbid anxiety and depression do not respond as well to therapy, have longer courses of
illness, and have less positive treatment outcomes, although selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors seems to be beneficial for these individuals. In reference to the neurological aspects of
mental disorders, there are implications that corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) plays a role in
both depressive and anxious symptomology. An increase of CRF neuronal activity has been
assessed as a state marker for depression and CRF also plays a role in the pathology of anxiety
disorders as a result of its effect on the central noradrenergic systems (Arborelius, Owens,
Plotsky & Nemeroof, 1999). Given that anxiety and depression may be the result of similar
pathophysiology, they may also have a similar effect on the recall of autobiographical memories
to that of depression.
Self-Defining Memories and Anxiety.
Although not as extensively studied as the impact of depression on self-defining memory
recall, research has examined the impact of anxiety on self-defining memory recall. Krans, de
Bree, and Bryant (2014) found that individuals who scored high in social anxiety recalled more
negative autobiographical memories with a focus on events related to social anxiety. These
individuals also reported that they had active goals to overcome social anxiety. This is
meaningful because current goals impact the recall of autobiographical memories according to
the Self-Memory System model of autobiographical memory. Therefore, the active goal of
overcoming social anxiety made an individual more likely to recall an autobiographical memory
with a focus on social anxiety, as this topic was of central interest to the individual.
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Sutherland and Bryant (2005) performed a similar study, except individuals were focused
on overcoming PTSD, not social anxiety. They found that individuals with PTSD reported more
negative, and fewer positive, self-defining memories than individuals without PTSD. Similarly to
Krans, de Bree, and Bryant’s (2014) findings, Sutherland and Bryant (2005) found that
individuals with PTSD reported memories with a focus on trauma. This once again suggests a
strong influence of current goals on the retrieval process on self-defining memories.
Further research suggests there may be a differential impact on autobiographical memory
based on an individual’s specific psychopathology. Rubin (2005) found that individuals who
were diagnosed with panic disorder or PTSD had a stronger memory for events involving
threatening stimuli, but that these findings did not hold true for individuals with generalized
anxiety disorder and social phobia. Rubin suggested that these findings may be due to the fact
that autobiographical memories involving events concerning trauma and fear are fundamentally
different from autobiographical memories involving events concerning social anxiety and
generalized anxiety (Rubin, 2005). As a result, traumatic experiences would be less likely to be
recalled by an individual with social anxiety or general anxiety, as trauma is not as central to the
self as it is in an individual with PTSD or a panic disorder. Rubin (2005) also found that
memories recalled concerning panic and trauma were more specific than memories concerning
worry and social phobia. This suggests that panic and trauma have less of a clouding effect on
recall than does social phobia and worry.
Although it appears that there have been no studies concerning the effects of anxiety on
the recall of self-defining memories, research concerning PTSD and social anxiety suggests that
anxiety does in fact impact recall. However, future research should be conducted in order to
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conclude whether or not generalized anxiety has the same clouding effect on recall as depression
does, given their similar psychopathology and past findings.
Self-Defining Future Projections.
Understanding how individuals view their future is just as important as understanding
how an individual recalls his or her past. It has been shown that self-defining memories are
important to personal identity, but anticipating meaningful events to occur in the future may play
a similar role in shaping personal identity (Demblon & D’Argembeau, 2016). D’Argembeau,
Lardi, and Van der Linden (2012) introduced the term “self-defining future projections” to
describe these predictions about our future. The counterpart to self-defining memories, selfdefining future projections are thought to have the same effect on an individual’s identity as a
self-defining memory. A self-defining future projection is a mental representation of a realistic,
but also significant, future event that an individual feels strongly will happen in the future
(D’Argembeau et al., 2012). These projections can be as simple as imagining yourself as being a
parent one day, since in the present moment you are relatively certain that this will happen one
day. Demblon and Argembeau (2016) argued that “in the same way as self-defining memory
support representations of present and past selves, self-defining projection may ground and
exemplify people’s conceptions of themselves in the future” (p. 2). Vingoles, Regalia, Manzi,
Golledge, and Scabini (2006) proposed that there are six identity motives that individuals
incorporate into their concepts of their own futures. These motives demonstrate an individual’s
values and how that individual wishes to be in the future. These six motives are: the self-esteem
motive, the distinctiveness motive, the continuity motive, the meaning motive, the belonging
motive, and the efficacy motive. As evidenced by their names, these motives were based on
Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs (Maslow, 1943, 1954). These motives often appear in self-
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defining future projections, as individuals feel that they need them in order to be successful and
to be happy (Maslow 1943, 1954).
Researchers have found that when asked to think about future events, individuals
overestimate the impact that future events will have on their mood, whether the predicted event
is negative or positive (Wenze, Hunthert, & German, 2012). This phenomenon has been termed
impact bias (Wenze et al., 2012). In one study, researchers hypothesized that the differences in
an individual’s ability to incorporate current moods in judgment-making influence likelihood
estimation. Likelihood estimation is similar to self-defining future projections in that both
concepts focus on an individual’s prediction of his or her future. These researchers found that
dysphoric individuals used negative emotion more often in cognition than positive emotion,
resulting in a pessimistic view of the future. These findings “suggest that dysphoric individuals’
tendency not to use positive emotion may be a cognitive mechanism distinguishing depressive
future-oriented thinking from more general mood effects” (Marroquin & Nolen-Hoeksema,
2015, p.130). In another study, researchers found that both depression and anxiety symptoms
were related to a bias in predicting a negative mood for the future (Wenze et al., 2012).
Therefore, understanding self-defining future projections and how each individual predicts and
envisions his or her future is crucial in helping to identify individuals who may be need treatment
for depression or anxiety.
The Present Study.
The proposed study will further research in the area of self-defining memory, which
appears to have few recent findings, despite its important implications in the formation of the
self. This study aims to replicate precious findings, which demonstrate a non-specific recall of
autobiographical memory, within a non-clinical population with elevated depressive symptoms.
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The present study elected not to present participants with a positive or negative cue for retrieval.
Instead, individuals were simply prompted to recall a self-defining memory, as defined by Singer
and Blagov (2000). The decision to abstain from emotional cueing was in hopes of overcoming
the difficulty that individuals with depression have in recalling a specific memory of a certain
valence, given the prior research that suggests that recalling a negative memory is less
challenging for an individual with depression than a positive memory (Clark & Teasdale, 1982;
Lloyd & Lishman, 1975; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). Therefore,
the this study would determine whether or not non-specific recall exists for individuals with
depression regardless of emotional cueing; they struggle to recall specific memories no matter
valence. The proposed study will also examine whether anxiety impacts self-defining memory
recall given the close relationship between anxiety and depressive disorders.
The proposed study will also address the effects of anxiety and depression on selfdefining future projections. Given the limited previous findings in this area, additional research
will be able to add to the confidence that depressive symptoms might have a similar detrimental
effect on future projections (e.g., predicting a more negative future) as it does on recalling past
memories. Furthermore, few studies concerning future projections have examined the impact of
anxiety on this cognitive process. Finally, little research has been conducted specifically on the
valence of future projections among depressed and anxious individuals, more specifically the
emotional tone of future projections.
Based on previous research, the proposed study hypothesized that: 1(a) memory type
(pure specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and
generic) is predictive of depression scores on the BDI; 1(b) memory type (pure specific, specific
with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic) is predictive of
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anxiety scores on the BAI, State form of the STAI, and Trait form of the STAI; 2(a) individuals
who report greater depressive symptomology will respond to a self-defining memory prompt
with non-specific responses significantly more than individuals who report less depressive
symptomology; 2(b) individuals who report higher anxiety symptomology will respond to a selfdefining memory prompt with non-specific responses significantly more than those with lower
anxiety symptomology; 3(a) Lower valence scores on the self-defining future projection task are
predictive of depression scores on the BDI; 3(b) Lower valence scores on the self-defining future
projections task are predictive of anxiety scores on the BAI, State form of the STAI, and Trait
form of the STAI; 4(a) Shorter lengths of responses on the self-defining future projection task
are predictive of depression scores on the BDI; 4(b) Shorter lengths of response on the selfdefining future projection task are predictive of anxiety scores on the BAI, State form of the
STAI, and Trait form of the STAI.
Method
Participants
The participants in this study were 52 undergraduate students enrolled at Union College, 32.7%
of whom were men and 67.3% of whom were women. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 22
years (M= 19.5, SD= 0.71) and 73.1% identified as Caucasian/White, 11.5% as Asian, 5.8% as
African American or Black, and 1.9% as Native American. Participants volunteered to
participate in the study advertised as “narrative memory and personality” through an online
psychology participant pool at Union College. Participants either received credit towards a
psychology course or received $6 monetary compensation in exchange for their participation.
Materials
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Demographic Questions. Participants were asked to complete three open-ended
questions regarding age, race, and gender, in order to determine the demographics of the sample.
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1961). A shortened version of the Beck
Depression Inventory, consisting of 20 questions on a Guttman scale ranging from 0-3, was
administered to participants in order to assess depressive symptoms. Question 9, which asks
about suicidal thoughts, was removed from the inventory per request of the Human Subjects
Review Committee. Therefore, the score on each item was summed to create a total score,
divided by the 20 questions to determine the average, and then multiplied by 21 to determine the
score for the full measure, with the lowest possible score being 0 and the highest possible being
63. The higher the score on the measure, the higher the degree of depressive symptomology
within the individual. The internal consistency of the BDI is reported as being .90, while the
retest reliability ranges from .73 to .96 (Wang & Gorenstein, 2013).
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Brown, Epstein, & Steer, 1988). The Beck
Anxiety Inventory, which consists of 21 questions, was administered to participants in order to
assess anxiety levels. The BAI was designed to better discriminate between anxiety and
depression, something that other anxiety inventories, including the STAI had not done
effectively (Beck, Brown, Epstein, & Steer, 1988), with STAI-BDI correlations of .60 reported
for the State scale and .73 reported for the Trait scale, respectively (Tanaka-Matsumi &
Kameoka, 1986). Participants were presented with a symptom such as “feeling hot” and were
asked to indicate how much they have been bothered by that symptom in the past month (0-not
at all, 1-mildly but it didn’t bother me much, 2- moderately- it wasn’t pleasant at times, 3severely-it bothered me a lot). Each item on the BAI was summed in order to determine a total
score, with a lowest possible score of 0 and a highest possible score of 63. The BAI has an
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internal consistency of α= .92 in a sample of adults ranging in age from17 to 80 years od and
test-retest reliability over one week of r(81)=.75 (Beck, Brown, Epstein, & Steer, 1988).
State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Speilberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg &
Jacobs, 1983). Forms Y-1 and Y-2, which contain a total of 40 questions, were administered to
participants in order to determine state and trait levels of anxiety in each individual. The first 20
questions ask the participant to assess how they are feeling in that moment in order to determine
the state anxiety score for that individual. Questions 21-40 ask the participant to assess how they
generally feel in order to determine the trait anxiety score for that individual. Participants are
presented with a statement and then are asked to select a corresponding score (1- Almost Never,
2- Sometimes, 3- Often, 4-Almost Never) that they best feel corresponds to how they are feeling
in that moment or how they feel generally. Scores for each question are summed, with some
being reversed coded. The higher the score on the STAI, the higher the level of anxiety within
the individual. Individuals were divided into low and high level groups of anxiety for the state
and trait forms, separately, based on a median split, as determined by the scores of all the
participants. Although the STAI has shown some correlation to the BDI (Tanaka-Matsumi &
Kameoka, 1986), the STAI has strong internal consistency and is useful as it provides both a
state and trait measure, something that the BAI does not provide. The internal consistency
coefficients for the STAI ranged from .86 to .95 and coefficients for test-retest reliability over
two months range from .65 to .75 (Speilberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983).
Self-Defining Memory Task (Singer & Blagov, 2000-2001). The Self-Defining
Memory Task was administered to participants in an adapted form. Participants were given the
definition of a self-defining memory as defined by Singer and Blagov and were then asked to
provide two self-defining memories, as opposed to the ten memories that the full task requires.
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Self-Defining Future Projection Question. Participants were asked to describe where
they see themselves in two years from that exact moment. They were instructed to use as much
time and space as they felt they needed to sufficiently answer the question.
Classification System and Scoring Manual for Self-defining Autobiographical
Memories (Singer & Blagov, 2000). The two self-defining memory responses were scored
using the guidelines set forth by Singer and Blagov in their scoring manual. Self-defining
memories were categorized as a pure specific memory, a specific memory with generalization, a
specific memory with multiple single events, an episodic narrative, or a generic narrative. Selfdefining memories were also then more generally classified as either specific or non-specific for
further analysis.
Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW): Instruction Manual and Affective
Ratings (Bradley & Lang, 1999). In designing the manual, participants were asked to rank
words depending on how happy or unhappy they made them feel on a one-to-ten point scale
represented by facial expressions ranging from a frown to a smile. The scores for each word
were then averaged in order to determine the average valence for that word. The lower the
average, the more unhappy the word and the higher the average the happier the word.
Text Analyzer (Online-Utility.org). An online text analyzer, online-utility.org, was used
to analyze the word count and word frequency of the self-defining future projection.
Procedure
The Human Subjects Review Committee at Union College approved this study. All
participants completed and signed an informed consent form prior to participating in this study,
and were debriefed following study completion. All participants were asked to complete an
electronic narrative writing task that consisted of the Self-Defining Memory Task (Singer &
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Blagov, 2000-2001). Specifically, participants were presented with the definition of a selfdefining memory and asked to provide two self-defining memories. They were then asked to
describe where they see themselves two years “from this exact moment” in an effort to see
whether or not individuals who present with anxiety and/or depression see the future in more
pessimistic terms when compared to individuals who do not present with anxiety or depression.
Once individuals completed the narrative writing task they were then asked to complete a
personality inventory, designed as an online survey. The personality inventory consisted of an
altered version of the BDI, and full versions of the BAI and STAI. Individuals were fully
debriefed at the completion of the study and informed that their written responses to the selfdefining future projection prompt would be further analyzed in conjunction by the onlineutility.org, an online text analyzer, as well as the ANEW to determine the average emotional
valence of the self-defining future projection. At this point participants had the opportunity to
have their responses and corresponding data destroyed so as to no longer participate in the study;
none of the individuals opted to withdraw their responses.
Statistical Analysis
Self-Defining Memory. Self-defining memory responses were categorized based on the
Classification System and Scoring Manual for Self-defining Autobiographical Memories as
either a pure specific memory, a specific memory with generalization, a specific memory with
multiple single events, an episodic narrative, or a generic narrative. Self-defining memories were
also then more generally classified as either specific or non-specific for further analysis (Singer
& Blagov, 2000-2001). The BAI, BDI, the State form of the STAI, and the Trait form of the
STAI were analyzed separately, due to the nature of their measures, in order to determine
whether depression and anxiety (general, state, and trait) have an effect on the specificity of self-
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defining memory. A One-way ANOVA was performed in order to determine if there was a
significant difference between specific or non-specific memory type for depression and anxiety
scores as determined by the BDI, BAI, and the State and Trait forms of the STAI. For this
analysis only participants who had responded with two specific or two general memory type
responses were considered (N=36). Four linear regressions were also performed in order to
determine if memory type (pure specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple
single events, episodic, and generic) was predictive of scores on the BDI, BAI, State form of the
STAI, and Trait form of the STAI. The type I error rate was set at p < .05 to determine whether
depression or anxiety significantly predicted memory type response.
Self-Defining Future Projections. Participant’s responses to the self-defining future
projection task were scored for valence by averaging the valence scores for each word used in
the response according to the valence scores reported by the ANEW. The BAI, BDI, the State
form of the STAI, and the Trait form of the STAI were analyzed separately, due to the nature of
the measures. Eight linear regression analyses were performed in order to determine whether
valence or length of response for the self-defining future projections was a predictor of scores on
the BDI, BAI, State form of the STAI, and the Trait form of the STAI. The type I error rate was
set at p < .05 to determine whether valence and length of response on the self-defining future
projections significantly predicted BDI, BAI, and STAI scores.
Results
Self-Defining Memory.
Inter-rater Reliability. For the responses on the modified Self-Defining Memory Task
the inter-rater reliability (Intraclass Correlation) was r = .89 (p < .05) for content.
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Findings. Contrary to what was expected, the One-Way ANOVA failed to detect a
significant difference between the scores on the BDI, BAI, State form the STAI, and Trait form
of the STAI for specific and general memory type response on the self-defining memory task.
However, the five memory types (pure specific, specific with generalization, specific with
multiple single events, episodic, and generic) were predictive of scores on the BDI and the BAI,
but not the State form of the STAI or the Trait form of the STAI. The results for analyses are
reported in Tables 1-5.
BDI. There was no significant difference between the mean scores on the BDI for
specific and non-specific memory types, F (1,33) = .02, p >.05 The linear regression analysis
found that memory type (pure specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple single
events, episodic, and generic) significantly predicted BDI scores, F (4, 46) = 2.58, p < .05, with
an R2 of .183. More specifically, the “specific with multiple single events” memory type was a
significant predictor of BDI scores (β = .38, p = .01).
BAI. There was no significant difference between the mean scores on the BAI for specific
and non-specific memory types, F (1,33) =1,23 , p >.05. The linear regression analysis showed
that memory type (pure specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple single
events, episodic, and generic) significantly predicted BAI scores, F (4, 46) = 3.33, p = .02, with
an R2 of .224. More specifically, the “specific with multiple single events” memory type (β =
.471, p = .002) and the episodic memory type (β = .366, p = .015) were significant predictors of
BAI scores.
State Form of the STAI. There was no significant difference between the mean scores on
the State form of the STAI for specific and non-specific memory types, F (1,33) = .13, p > .05. A
linear regression analysis was performed to predict BAI scores based on memory type (pure
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specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic).
Results were not statistically significant, F (4, 46) = .592, p > .05, with an R2 of .049.
Trait Form of the STAI. There was no significant difference between the mean scores on
the Trait form of the STAI for specific and non-specific memory types, F(1,33) =.10, p > .05. A
linear regression analysis was performed to predict BAI scores based on memory type (pure
specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic).
Results were not statistically significant, F (4, 46) = .941, p >.05), with an R2 of .074.
Self-Defining Future Projection.
Findings. Contrary to what was expected, valence and length of self-defining future
projections were not significant predictors of BDI, State form of the STAI, and the Trait form of
the STAI, in linear regression analyses. However, valence scores, but not length of responses,
were predictive of scores on the BAI. The results of these analyses are reported in Tables 6-9.
Discussion
In contrast to what was predicted, there was no significant difference the mean scores on
the BDI, BAI, State form of the STAI, and Trait form of the STAI for specific and general
memory responses on the self-defining memory task. It was also found that memory type (pure
specific, specific with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic)
on the self-defining memory task was not predictive of scores on the State and Trait forms of the
STAI. However, supporting hypotheses, it was found that memory types (pure specific, specific
with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic) on the selfdefining memory task were predictive of scores on the BDI and BAI. Individuals who had lower
scores on the BDI and BAI tended to report the specific memory types (pure specific, specific
with generalization, and specific with multiple single events). In particular, the specific with
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multiple single events memory type was predictive of lower scores on the BDI and BAI and
episodic memory type was predictive of elevated scores on the BAI. In other words, individuals
who are less anxious and depressed tend to respond more often with the specific with multiple
single events memory type and those who are more anxious tend to respond with the episodic
memory type, suggesting that memory type may be a predictive factor in determining anxiety
and depression levels when specific with multiple single events and episodic memory types are
present. Furthermore, this finding also follows the trend that individuals with higher
symptomology respond more often with general memory types (episodic) than specific (specific
with generalization).
On the self-defining future memory task, valence and length scores were not predictive
of scores on the BDI, State form of the STAI and Trait form of the STAI, nor was length of the
self-defining future projection task predictive of BAI scores. However, negatively valence scores
on the self-defining future projections task were predictive of higher BAI scores.
Unlike previous findings that showed an effect of depression on an individual’s ability to
recall specific memories in a nonclinical population (Moffit, Singer, Nelligan, Carlson, & Vyse,
1994), this study failed to find an effect of depression on specific and general memory recall.
However, this study did find that the five memory types (pure specific, specific with
generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic) were predictive of
scores on the BDI. The failure to replicate previous findings that depression has an effect on
specific and general memory recall may be a result of the new scoring guidelines. In the past the
specific with multiple single events was often falsely scored as a non-specific memory type, and
the increase from two categories (specific and non-specific) to five (pure specific, specific with
generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic) allowed for more

PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS, MEMORY, AND THE FUTURE

25

accurate scoring of memory types. With a larger number of individuals falling into the specific
with multiple single events category as opposed to one of the non-specific categories (episodic
and generic) this study may provide a more accurate representation of the effects of depression
and anxiety on an individual’s ability to recall specific memories. The average BDI score for the
present study was M= 7.77, SD= 6.74, well within the range of normal mood changes.
Furthermore, the median BDI score was 5.25, indicating that 50% of the participants scored in
normal mood changes range.
The STAI also produced null results for self-defining memories and self-defining future
projections. Tanaka-Matsumi and Kameoka (1986) found that the STAI was correlated to the
BDI (a correlation of .60 for the State scale and .73 for the Trait scale), suggesting that the STAI
does not measure anxiety symptomology completely independently of depression. A correlation
between scores on the State and Trait scales of the STAI and the BDI was performed for the
scores in the present study, and a significant correlation was determined (r= .56, p<.001, for
state anxiety and r=.80, p<.001 for trait anxiety) replicating previous findings. Given, the null
findings on the effect of BDI scores for specific and general memory response on the selfdefining memory task, the failure of valence and length of response on self-defining future
projections to predict scores on the BDI, and the high correlation between the STAI and the BDI,
it is not surprising that null results occurred for the STAI as well. Furthermore, the median score
for the STAI for the state form was 34 and 37 for the trait form. A cut-score of 39 has been
suggested for the determination of clinically significant symptomology on either form the STAI
(Julian, 2011). At least 50% of participants did not reach clinical symptomology, resulting in
range restriction, and therefore there may not have been enough variability between scores to
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accurately determine the effects of state and trait anxiety on specific and general self-defining
memories.
Some of the limitations of the present study include range restriction for the BDI and the
STAI, which resulted in mean scores that placed individuals within the normative range, with
few scores in clinically significant ranges. This may have resulted in null results and a failure to
replicate previous findings that depression was associated with decreased ability to recall specific
memories. Secondly, the strong correlation between the BDI and the State and Trait forms of the
STAI suggest that the STAI may have been studying anxiety disorders that had greater overlap
with depressive symptomology. Therefore, the results concerning the STAI were not
independently assessing anxiety, but were nevertheless helpful in assessing different forms of
anxiety, as some anxious individuals exhibit depressive symptomology as well. Future research
could utilize anxiety measures with minimal correlation to depression that exclude items
assessing common symptomology, in order to address anxiety disorders that have minimal
overlap with depressive symptomology. Thirdly, the current sample was a convenience sample
and may not generalize to the broader population, as the current sample consisted of young
adults who were predominantly female and predominantly White. Lastly, the small sample size
of this study resulted in limited statistical power necessary to detect small effect sizes typically
seen in nonclinical samples, an occurrence that could easily be remedied by replicating this study
with a larger sample.
Despite these limitations, the current study had notable strengths. This study was the first
to examine the effects of anxiety on self-defining memory and found that the type of memory
response on a self-defining memory task as well as the valence score on a self-defining future
projection task are predictive of anxiety scores on the BAI. This study was also the first to
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examine valence and length of self-defining future projections as predictors of depressive and
anxiety symptomatology. Although valence and length of self-defining future projections was
not predictive of BDI, and STAI scores, valence was predictive of BAI scores, suggesting the
importance of examining this relationship in future research. Lastly, although the STAI
demonstrated a strong correlation to the BDI, the BAI was designed to study anxiety
independently of depression, and therefore the significant finding that self-defining memory type
is predictive of anxiety scores suggests that anxiety, independent of depression, may have an
effect on memory type retrieval.
A larger non-clinical sample may improve range and variability amongst scores and
allow for a more accurate representation of high and low scores on each measure. The failure to
replicate previous findings of the effects of depression on self-defining memories suggests that
non-clinical samples of this size may not be suitable for replicating previous findings, as effect
sizes are likely to be smaller within nonclinical samples than those comparing clinical to
nonclinical groups. The failure to replicate previous findings also demonstrates that the general
and specific memory types on the self-defining memory task are not refined as an indicator of
depression at lower ranges of depressive symptomatology, but is instead better designed to
identify moderate and more severe levels of depression. However, memory type (pure specific,
specific with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic) is
predictive of scores on the BDI and may be useful in determining individuals in need of
psychiatric intervention. Furthermore, this study determined that anxiety, as measured by the
BAI, affects an individual’s ability to recall specific memory types, a new finding for selfdefining memory research, and even more importantly found that memory type (pure specific,
specific with generalization, specific with multiple single events, episodic, and generic) on a self-
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defining memory task is predictive of scores on the BAI. This suggests that anxiety may have the
same clouding affect in reference to specifics that previous researchers suggested that depression
has on memory. Just as depression utilizes much of an individual’s cognitive resources, anxiety
may do the same, reducing the cognitive resources that an individual has to encode and retrieve
specifics for memory.
Future research should focus on replicating the previous non-clinical findings of Moffit,
Singer, Nelligan, Carlson, and Vyse (1994) in larger samples, which would be expected to
increase variation in scores. Furthermore, research should be done to refine the self-defining
memory task for children to see if it can be used as an accurate marker for children who are at
risk for anxiety and depression. This task would be a low-stress activity that could be beneficial
for identifying children who may require more testing to determine if they meet the diagnostic
criteria of anxiety and depression. Future research should also examine the effects of anxiety and
depression on self-defining future projections, as the limited sample in this study may have failed
to determine an effect that may exist in larger samples with greater variability.
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Table 1. One-Way ANOVA (N=36). The Significance Level of the Difference Between Mean
Scores on the BDI, BAI, State Form of the STAI and Trait Form of the STAI for Specific and
Non-Specific Memory Types on the Self-Defining Memory Task.
F

df

sig (2-tailed)

BDI

.02

1, 33

.88

BAI

1.24

1, 33

.27

State form of the
STAI

.13

1, 33

.72

Trait form of the
STAI

.10

1, 33

76

34

PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS, MEMORY, AND THE FUTURE

35

Table 2. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for Memory Type on the Self-Defining
Memory Task Predicting Scores on the BDI (N=51).
Variable
Pure Specific

Specific with
Multiple Single

B

SE(B)

β

Sig.

-2.07

1.98

-.15

.30

4.77

1.83

.38

.01*

1.70

1.45

.18

.25

-.80

3.11

-.04

.80

Events
Episodic
Generic
*Significant Finding
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Table 3. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for Memory Type on the Self-Defining
Memory Task Predicting Scores on the BAI (N=51).
Variable

B

SE(B)

β

Sig.

Pure Specific

2.75

2.78

.14

.33

Specific with
Multiple Single

8.50

2.57

.47

.002*

5.12

2.03

5.48

4.36

Events
Episodic
Generic
*Significant Finding

.27

.17

.02*
.22
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Table 4. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for Memory Type on the Self-Defining
Memory Task Predicting Scores on the State form of the STAI (N=51).
Variable

B

SE(B)

β

Sig.

Pure Specific

-2.32

3.19

-.11

.47

Specific with
Multiple Single

1.86

2.95

.10

.53

Episodic

2.26

2.33

.16

.34

Generic

.09

5.01

.00

.99

Events
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Table 5. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for Memory Type on the Self-Defining
Memory Task Predicting Scores on the Trait form of the STAI (N=51).
Variable

B

SE(B)

β

Sig.

Pure Specific

-1.75

3.55

-.08

.63

Specific with
Multiple Single

5.42

3.28

.26

.11

Episodic

1.70

2.60

.10

.52

Generic

-.32

5.58

-.00

.96

Events
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Table 6. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for Valence and Length of Response on the
Self-Defining Future Projection Task Predicting Scores on the BDI (N=46).
Variable

B

SE(B)

β

Sig.

Valence

4.61

2.95

.23

.13

Length of
Response

-.00

.01

-.02

.90
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Table 7. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for Valence and Length of Response on the
Self-Defining Future Projection Task Predicting Scores on the BAI (N=46).
Variable

B

SE(B)

β

Sig.

Valence

9.05

3.82

.34

.02*

-.03

.02

.28

.06

Length of
Response
*Significant Finding
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Table 8. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for the Valence and Length of Response on the
Self-Defining Future Projection Task Predicting Scores on the State Form of the STAI (N=46).
Variable

B

SE(B)

β

Sig.

Valence

5.85

4.64

.19

.21

Length of
Response

-.01

.02

-.04

.80
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Table 9. Summary of Linear Regression Analysis for the Valence and Length of Response on the
Self-Defining Future Projection Task Predicting Scores on the Trait Form of the STAI (N=46).
Variable

B

SE(B)

β

Sig.

Valence

5.39

5.27

.15

.31

Length of
Response

-.01

.03

.08

.62

